Online social networks (OSNs) are currently a popular platform for social interactions among people. Usually, OSN users upload various contents including personal information on their profiles. The ability to infer users' hidden information or information that has not been even uploaded (i.e. private/sensitive information) by an unauthorised agent is commonly known as attribute inference problem. In this paper, we propose 3LP+, a privacy-preserving technique, to protect users' sensitive information leakage. We apply 3LP+ on a synthetically generated OSN data set and demonstrate the superiority of 3LP+ over an existing privacy-preserving technique.
INTRODUCTION
Data mining of users' information on Online Social Networks (OSNs) can reveal individuals' private information. News pieces, reported by the Boston Globe (Johnson, 2009) , reveals that users' sexual orientation can be correctly predicted by accessing their non-sensitive information. Hence, the ability of an intruder to infer users' sensitive information is known as the attribute inference problem.
A technique (PrivNB), based on the Naïve Bayes classifier, can protect a sensitive attribute of users by suppressing attribute values identified as predictors and deleting some friendship links (Heatherly et al., 2013) . Another technique called 3LP (Reza et al., 2017a) uses a decision forest algorithm to enhance users' privacy against the attribute inference problem. 3LP in its first layer suggests to a victim user which predictor attribute values to suppress from the user's profile. If the sensitive information of the user is still unprotected even after the suppression of predictor attributes, then 3LP suggests to hide some existing friends from the user's friend list in its Layer 2 and add new friends in Layer 3.
In this study, we propose 3LP+ which is an extension of the existing 3LP algorithm (Reza et al., 2017a) . 3LP assumes the existence of a single sensitive attribute such as the "Political View" while in reality a user is likely to have multiple sensitive attributes such as the "Political View" and "Sexual Orientation". To protect the privacy of multiple sensitive attributes 3LP could be applied multiple times, but every run of 3LP would be isolated/independent. As a result, they can be counterproductive in the sense that one run (say to protect the "Political View") might suggest hiding a friendship information with another user while a subsequent run (say to protect "Sexual Orientation") might suggest disclosing the same friendship information resulting in the loss of protection of "Political View". 3LP+ aims to provide privacy for multiple sensitive attributes through a co-ordinated approach as opposed to the isolated approach. It uses a matrix to store the history of any friendship being hidden or new frinedship being created during a run to avoid a conflicting suggestion in a subsequent run. For example, if the t-th run suggests hiding a friendship of the victim user with another user (and the victim user actions on the suggestion), then the matrix stores that information so that a subsequent run does not suggest the victim user creating the friendship with the same user.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the privacy attack model considered in this study. Section 3 presents the privacypreserving technique 3LP+. We describe our experi- (a) Tree-1 (b) Tree-2 Figure 1 : Decision trees build on the sample data set given in Table 1. mental set up in Section 4 and the experimental results in Section 5. Section 6 gives a concluding remark.
PRIVACY ATTACK SCENARIO
An attacker M can follow any approach to invade users' privacy. We consider a data mining approach, in this study, assuming that, M prepares a data set by analyzing an OSN of N users, each with A attributes and friendship information. We name an attribute, and it's corresponding value together as an attribute-value pair. Here each attribute value (A n = v) is considered as a distinct binary attribute. In a Social attribute network (SAN) model, both users and their attributevalues are modeled as vertices.
The attacker can take advantage of a metric function as shown in Equation 1 (Adamic and Adar, 2003) , to incorporate the friendship information into D.
Here, Γ s+ (u) is a set of OSN users connected to a user u and Γ s+ (A n = v) is the set of users having the attribute-value A n = v. Similarly, Γ A n + (u) is the set of all attribute-value pairs linked to user u. Therefore, the neighbourhood of u is represented as, Γ + (u) = Γ s+ (u) ∪ Γ A n + (u). On the other hand, t is the set of u's friends who have an attribute-value pair
The w(t) is the weight of each of them and it's value is set to 1 in this study. The higher the value of m(u, A n = v), the higher the chance that u has the value v for attribute A n . For illustration, we suppose M wants to know the emotional status of u who considers it as sensitive and hence hides it from public view. To launch the attack, M can first prepare a data set by storing the user u's available information (for example, Relationship status and Profession) in it. Then M can visit the profiles of other users who disclose their emotional status as well as, additional information (i.e. Relationship status and Profession in this example) and store all these information in D. We present a sample of such data set in Table 1. The information directly related to OSN users (e.g. Relationship status and Profession as shown in Table 1 ) are named regular attributes, whereas the information related to the friendship links (that can be calculated by using Equation 1) are named link attributes. M can consider "Emotional Status" as the class attribute and apply any machine-learning technique to obtain the patterns of the lonely and connected users from the data set. In Figure 1 , we present a sample decision forest which can be built from D (as shown in Table 1 ). Here, the rectangular boxes are called nodes and ovals are called leaves. The path from a root node to a leaf is called a logic rule. By using these rules, the attacker can predict the emotional status of a new user u (who is not in Table 1 ) even when the user does not disclose the information.
We argue that OSN users may have diverse preferences on what they consider sensitive. For example, one may consider their emotional status as sensitive while others may consider their emotional status and/or political view as sensitive.
Therefore, a privacy-preserving technique should be capable of protecting all sensitive information for each user and should be capable of providing privacy when attackers use a different classifier than the one that the technique expects them to use. Again, a large number of attribute value suppression may provide better privacy, but at the same time, it also defeats the whole purpose of using social network sites for a user. The goal should be to provide privacy by suppressing the minimum number of attribute values.
OUR TECHNIQUE
The basic idea of 3LP+ is to protect the privacy of all information that a user consider sensitive. Users can give the list of attributes they considers sensitive and then, 3LP+ provides three steps (or layers) of recommendations:
Step 1: Compute the sensitivity of each attribute for each user and suggest to the user which attribute values the user needs to suppress. In Step 1, as shown in Algorithm , 3LP+ selects a class attribute (from the list of sensitive attributes considered by the 3LP+ User u) randomly, prepares a training data set D, and then applies SysFor (Islam and Giggins, 2011) on D to get a set of logic rules. 3LP+ then uses the support and confidence of each rule to compute its sensitivity (or Rule Sensitivity) value in breaching the privacy of a sensitive attribute. Similar to previous studies (Reza et al., 2017a; Reza et al., 2017b) , the rules having Rule Sensitivity value 1.006 or above are considered Sensitive Rules in this study. We utilize the function GetSensitiveRules() to represent the processes of generating the sensitive rule set R u for u.
After preparing the sensitive rule set R u , 3LP+ counts the number of appearance of each regular attribute A n in R u and store A n in A s . Here, A s stores all the regular attributes and the number of their appearances in R u . One attribute can appear only once in a sensitive rule R u j but more than once in R u . The regular attribute A n with the highest number of appearances in R u is suggested to u for suppression. The decision is then up to u whether to suppress its value or not. If u suppresses the value of A n , then A n is no longer available in A s and all sensitive rules in R u that have A n in their antecedent are no longer applicable for u. Regardless whether u suppresses the attribute or not, 3LP+ then identifies A n with the next highest appearances and suggests u to suppress that. The process continues until R u or A s becomes empty.
Step 2: Hide friendship links as necessary if they are not fabricated previously.
After Layer 1, if any sensitive rule remains in R u such a rule only uses link attributes (i.e. the attribute values can only be altered by using Eq. 1). Therefore, if a link attribute appears as an antecedent of a sensitive rule R u j (i.e. R u j ∈ R u ), where the value of the link attribute needs to be greater than a constant SplitPoint (as mentioned in R u j ), the 3LP+ explores to reduce its value < SplitPoint by hiding some of u's friendship links. By doing this 3LP+ makes the rule unusable to predict the class value of u with certainty.
In
Step 2, 3LP+ first identifies the link attribute, A n , that appears most in the sensitive rule set R u and compute A n 's value, denoted as V , using Eq. 1. If V is higher than the split point mentioned in R u j , then 3LP+ suggests u to hide a friendship link. While choosing a friendship link, 3LP+ selects a friend, t i , of u who has the smallest degree and has not previously appeared in the friendship matrix F (here F is an 1 × N matrix which stores the Flag information for u). The 3LP+ recommends u to hide t i so that it can reduce V 's value the most by hiding a minimum number of friends. If u follows the recommendation, 3LP+ puts a Flag up in the i th column of the friendship matrix F and this ex-friend will not be recommended for further hiding or adding. 3LP+ then updates G , F , and recomputes V 's value.
This process continues until the value V is lower than the SplitPoint mentioned in R u j . Once the V is lower than the split point, then the process of hiding friends stops and 3LP+ removes R u j and other rules (which have an antecedent with the value V ) from R u as they are no longer be applicable to determine u's class value. At the end of Step 3, if R u is not empty then only 3LP+ moves to Step 3 i.e. Layer 3.
Step 3: Add friendship links as necessary if they are not fabricated previously. After Step 1 and Step 2, any sensitive rule remains in R u , that contains link attribute only and tests for a value V ≤ some SplitPoint in its antecedent. In this case, 3LP+ suggests u to add new friends so that the V becomes greater than the split point in R u j and thus R u j is no longer applicable to u. While adding any friend on u's friend list, a user t i is selected in such a way that a Flag has not been up previously in the i th column of F matrix and having the smallest Γ + (t) value. If u accepts the recommendation, 3LP+ then updates the matrix F , friendship graph G , and V increases. This adding process continues until the value V exceeds the split point value. It is noted that, adding a new friend on a profile is complicated and depends on the other users to confirm the friendship on OSN. Hence, 3LP+
Algorithm 1: The Steps of 3LP+.
Input : User u, data set D, friendship network G, total number of records N in D, set of non-class attributes A, set of regular attributes A r , set of link attributes A l where A r , A l ⊂ A, set of class attributes C.
Output
: Recommendations for u.
Variables
: R = set of sensitive rules, R j = the j th sensitive rule, A n = the n th attribute, and F = 1 × N matrix stores Flag information for u /*Initially all values in F are set to False */.
Step 1: Compute Sensitivity of Each Attribute for a User and Suggest the User to Suppress Attribute Values as Necessary. R u ← GetSensitiveRulesForUser(D, A,C, u) foreach R u j ∈ R u do n = 0 /* The value of n is always reset to 0 before the initiation of W hile loop */ while n < |A| do if A n ∈ A r AND A n is in the antecedent of R u j then A s ← A s ∪ {A n } /* Add A n in an array A s */ Counter n ← Counter n + 1 /* Counts the number of appearance of A n in A s */ n = n + 1 while R u = φ AND A s = φ do n ← maxarg(Counter, A) /* Returns the index of the attribute that appears the most */ SuggestSuppress(A n ) /* Suggest u to suppress the value of A n */ if A n is suppressed then 
Step 3: Add Friendship Links as Necessary if they are not fabricated previously.
n ← FindIndexMostSensitive(A l , R u ) and V ← CalculateValue(A n , u) using Equation 1 */ while R u = φ AND A l = φ do for j = 1 to |R u | do if A n is in the antecedent of R u j AND V ≤ SplitPoint(R u j , A n ) then while V ≤ SplitPoint(R u j , A n ) AND MoreUsers(G , F , A n ) do t i ← UserWithLeastDegree(G , F , A n ) /* i is the index of the User with least degree when F i ∈ F is False */ SuggestAdd(t i ) and G ← AddLink(G , u,t i ) /* t i is the i th user */
keeps these recommendations as a last resort. Our experimental results also indicate this step is seldom required.
EXPERIMENTS

Data Set
We implement the privacy techniques on a syntheti-cally generated OSN data set (Nettleton, 2015) and denote it as D. The data set contains 1000 records, 11 regular attributes, and 50,397 friendship links among the users. In order to insert users' link attribute values into the data set, we calculate metric values for each regular attribute (using Equation (1)) and therefore, the total number of attributes becomes 22 (i.e. 11 regular attributes and 11 link attributes).
We prepare three versions of D for the experimental purposes for three different class attributes and they are: political orientation denoted as D P , religious view denoted as D R , and sexual orientation denoted as D S . When we consider a particular attribute as a class attribute then rest of the attributes are considered as non-class attributes. For example, in D P data set, both religious view and sexual orientation are considered as non-class attributes.
We follow 10-fold cross validation method through out our experiments. Therefore, in each fold, a training data set, D tr , contains 900 records and a testing data set, denoted as D ts , contains 100 records (i.e. 10% of the total records). In order to justify the efficiency of our technique, we again split these 100 test data records, in each fold, into three different groups based on the different percentage of records. We present these three groups and their records distribution in Figure 2 .
The Group 1 consists of 60 users who consider any single attribute (i.e. either "political orientation" or "religious view" or "sexual orientation") as sensitive. On the other hand, we assume 30 users, in Group 2, have considered any two attributes (out of the three attributes) as sensitive. Finally, Group 3 consists of 10 users who consider all the three attributes as sensitive. While preparing a test data set e.g. D ts,X we select the records who consider X as a sensitive information and return all other records in training data set D tr,X . For example, we keep 50 records in D ts,P (as shown in D ts,P column ) who consider political orientation as sensitive and return rest of the 950 records in the training data set D tr,P . Here the different cell colours indicate different records and the same colour represents the same records.
Experimental Set-up
We now describe the experimental set-up in three phases for three different sensitive attributes. In Phase I, we first protect the privacy for political view, then for religious view in Phase II, and finally, for sexual orientation in Phase III. We argue that the 3LP+ can protect privacy of all the sensitive information (which are selected by its users) regardless to the sequence of selection as a class attribute. Therefore, we also conduct experiments in an opposite sequence order but for simplicity we only describe the experimental set-up here for first sequence order.
Phase I. At first step, shown in Figure 3 , we prepare a training data set D tr,P , and a testing data set D ts,P from the main data set D by considering users' political view as a class attribute. At Step 2, we apply the two privacy preserving techniques, i.e. 3LP+ and PrivNB, on the insecure test data sets. Here the term 'insecure' means that the 3LP+ or PrivNB have not been applied previously on the test data sets and hence the users' class value can be determined by an attacker easily. The test data sets are then secured by the techniques, as shown in Step 3, denoted as D ts,P and D * ts,P respectively. We calculate and compare the number of insecure users exists in the insecure and secure data sets. In order to provide privacy 3LP+ and PrivNB modifies the data sets by hiding information/friends or adding friends. Therefore, we use two different symbols and * throughout the experimental set-up to denote the modified data sets by 3LP+ and PrivNB techniques respectively.
A privacy provider may not determine the classifier which is going to be used by an attacker and therefore, the privacy protecting technique should be able to protect privacy against any machine learning tools.
In our experiments we explore and compare the performance of 3LP+ and PrivNB for different classifiers such as Naïve Bayes classifier (NB), Support Vector Machine (SV M), and Random Forest algorithm (RF). In order to do that we first apply these machine learning algorithms on insecure data set D ts,P in Step 1 and find the number of number of insecure users in the test data set. We name it as classifiers' accuracy which refers to the number of users whose class value is identified by the classifiers. The larger the accuracy value indicates lower the privacy.
We then apply the different classifiers on secure test data sets D ts,P and D * ts,P in Step 3. By comparing the classifiers' accuracy results, in Step 1 and Step 3, we then determine which technique provides better privacy on the test data sets. The results are presented in terms of number of insecure users, denoted as t s 0 and classifiers' accuracy, denoted as t c 1 0 . In Step 3, we also calculate data utility (in terms of number of suppressed attribute values) in D ts,P and D * ts,P after applying the two privacy preserving techniques and denoted as t u 3 . In Figs. 3 -10, we use different colours of arrows to indicate the procedure of two different privacy preserving techniques. Phase II. After Phase I, we select religious view as a class attribute. We first prepare training and testing data sets and denote them as D tr,R and D ts,R which are prepared from D . Similarly, D * tr,R and D * ts,R are prepared from D * . In Step 5, different classifiers are applied on D ts,R and D * ts,R , denoted by C 4 and C 5 re-spectively, to measure the classifiers' accuracy. Then we apply 3LP+ and PrivNB on test data sets in Step 7 (in order to secure the users' privacy). After
Step 7 we again return all the records to original data set and thus it modified to D 2 and D 2 * for 3LP+ and PrivNB respectively. In Step 9, we again investigate the safety of users (who consider Political view as sensitive) in D ts,P and D * ts,P due to providing the privacy to users who consider Religious View again by analysing the number of insecure users. in D 2 ts,P and D 2 * ts,P only.
Phase III. We select sexual orientation as a class attribute in this phase and similar to previous two phases, we first prepare training and testing data sets i.e. D tr,S and D ts,S as shown in Figure 10 . In Step 10, we apply different classifiers, denoted by C 10 and C 11 , on the two test data sets D 2 ts,R and D 2 * ts,R to find the classification accuracy before and applying any privacy techniques. We then apply 3LP+ on D 2 ts,R and PrivNB on D 2 * ts,R in Step 11. We denote D 3 ts,R and D 3 * ts,R to represent the secure test data sets and apply different classifiers, denoted by C 10 and C 11 , again on them in Step 12. After securing the test data sets, similar to Phase I and Phase II, we again analyse and compare the number of insecure users in Step 15a and
Step 15b as shown in Figure 10 . 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We present and compare the experimental results of two privacy preserving techniques i.e. 3LP+ and PrivNB in this section. The results are presented in terms of accuracy (in percentage) and the step numbers (as mentioned in the experimental set-up Section 4.2).
Step number information is presented in the x-axis and accuracy information is presented in the y-axis. Here the term accuracy indicates the number of users whose class value is identified by the attacker. Higher accuracy indicates the greater chance for the intruder to infer the class value of a user and vice versa. In Figure 4 we present the number of insecure users whose class value can still be inferred by applying the same classifier used by the privacy protection technique. We first provide privacy by the two privacy techniques separately as described in the Section 4.2. Here y-axis represents prediction probability to classify a record (regardless to correctly or incorrectly classified) by an intruder after the protection techniques are applied. We observe that the probability percentage of records is much higher for PrivNB compared to 3LP+ except at Step 1. This is because the privacy preserving techniques are yet to implement at Step 1 as shown in Figure 3 . On the other hand, in Figure 5 , the percentage of correctly classified records by PrivNB is approximately 70% more than the 3LP+.
In order to explore the performance of two privacy protection techniques against three conventional classifiers i.e. NB, SV M, and RF, we use the available classifier packages in WEKA. Figure 7 shows the results of using NB as a classification technique. We observe when we provide privacy to users in test data sets by using 3LP+, the classification accuracy of NB drops about 10 percent as shown at Step 1 and
Step 3. However, this accuracy drops is less than 10 percent in case of PrivNB. The similar trend is observed throughout the experimental steps and our technique clearly outperforms the existing PrivNB technique. On the other hand, a similar classification accuracy drops is observed for SV M and RF classifiers as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.
We also measure the data utility in terms of suppression for both techniques. In each test data set, (50 records*10 regular attribute values=500) 500 maximum attribute values are available before applying any privacy techniques. In Figure 11 we show the results for Step 3, Step 7, and Step 12 only as the privacy techniques are applied in these steps. We observe, in each step, the number of attribute value suppression by the PrivNB technique is three times higher than 3LP+.
CONCLUSION
We propose 3LP+ in this study to provide users' privacy on social media. Previous privacy preserving techniques can protect users' single sensitive attribute (from being inferred) whereas 3LP+ can protect users' multiple sensitive attributes in one run. Our experimental results indicate that 3LP+ can provide better privacy while maintaining higher utility than an existing privacy preserving technique even if an attacker uses a different set of classifiers.
